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2 Tero Kivinen: Animal Rights and Rhetorical Topoi 
1 Introduction 
In this paper, I’ll argue that, among other things, animal rights can be understood 
as a kind of rhetoric that seeks to persuade people into improving the societal 
status of animals. In section 2, I briefly describe how the concept of animal rights 
ought to be understood for the purposes of my argument. In section 3, I outline 
what rhetoric means and how exactly audiences are persuaded by using its 
toolkit. I then examine the way animal rights discourse functions in rhetorical 
terms before moving on to certain problems associated with the logical type of 
argumentation generally used in animal rights advocacy. In section 4, I classify 
the rhetoric of animal rights further as political oratory. Having briefly discussed 
the so-called ‘topics’ or topoi of rhetorical theory, I sketch three lines of 
argument that might better suit the future-oriented nature of animal rights 
discourse. Finally, in section 5, I present some concluding remarks about 
rhetorical theory’s potential for improving the effectiveness of the animal rights 
movement.  
2 Animal Rights 
Let me begin by defining what I mean by animal rights. ‘From its outset,’ writes 
Joyce Tischler, ‘the animal law movement has struggled with the distinction 
between rights’, on the one hand, ‘and welfare’, on the other, ‘and the resulting 
choice of which concept to spend one’s time promoting.’1 Many now believe the 
distinction to be a bit outdated. Indeed, these positions are hardly extremes in 
that animals simply couldn’t have it any worse than animal welfare (or better 
than animal rights, for that matter). Nor does it seem true that intermediate or 
otherwise mixed positions simply couldn’t exist2. Be that as it may, the 
dichotomy does provide a good starting point for making sense of normative 
claims made on behalf of animals and thus arguably still remains, at least in some 
ways, ‘at the center of modern animal advocacy’3. 
2.1 Animal Welfare 
To outline first the contrasting position ever so briefly, the animal welfare view 
holds that it’s permissible for humans to use animals for a variety of purposes as 
                                                 
* Tero Kivinen, Doctoral Candidate, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki. Email: 
tero.kivinen@helsinki.fi. 
1  Joyce Tischler, ‘A Brief History of Animal Law, Part II (1985 – 2011)’ (2012) 5 Stanford 
Journal of Animal Law and Policy 27, 48 (emphasis added). See also 52; Joyce Tischler, 
‘The History of Animal Law, Part I (1972 – 1987)’ (2008) 1 Stanford Journal of Animal Law 
and Policy 1, 26, 28. 
2  For a so-called ‘intrinsic value’ position, see Elisa Aaltola and Birgitta Wahlberg, 
‘Nonhuman Animals: Legal Status and Moral Considerability’ (2015) 38(4) Retfærd 83. For 
so-called ‘new welfarism’, see eg Gary L Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of 
the Animal Rights Movement (Temple University Press 1996). 
3  Gary L Francione and Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation? 
(Columbia University Press 2010) xii. 
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long as they’re spared ‘unnecessary’ suffering and treated ‘humanely’ (whatever 
that means)4. Put differently, ‘[a]nimal welfare proponents believe that humans 
can interact with animals in entertainment, industry, sport and recreation, … but 
that the interaction should include provisions for the proper care and 
management for all animals involved.’5 Animal welfare, then, is not so much 
about whether we use animals as it is about how we use them. 
The above descriptions do provide some insight as to what animal welfare is 
about in rather general terms, but they don’t go particularly far in terms of 
explaining why the position looks the way it does. Why is it alright to use animals 
instrumentally provided certain safeguards are in place? As far as I can see, at 
least two explanations have been offered in literature thus far. The first one 
explains the inner workings of animal welfare theory in terms of moral 
philosophy. The other one explains it from a more economic point of view. 
Starting with the moral explanation, Robert Garner argues that ‘[t]he idea of 
animal welfare recognizes the moral standing of animals but it does not, of 
course, postulate moral equality. Rather, its central feature is an insistence that 
humans are morally superior to animals. Animals matter, but not as much as 
humans.’6 Garner commends Robert Nozick for providing ‘a concise but 
admirably effective definition of animal welfare when he writes that it 
constitutes “utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people.”’7 For Nozick, 
that phrase represented the idea that whereas the happiness of all living beings—
animals included—was something to be maximized in society, humans enjoy 
certain immunities against the sheer utilitarianism of this business of happiness-
maximization in that they ‘may not be used or sacrificed for the benefit of 
others’8. Humans, in other words, enjoy certain kinds of base protections that 
trump appeals to the greater good. Animals, on the other hand, ‘may be used or 
sacrificed for the benefit of other people or animals only if those benefits are 
greater than the loss inflicted’9. Put differently, the fate of animals is to be judged 
according to utilitarian considerations and such considerations alone. 
Most contemporary legal regulation involving animals arguably conforms to 
the language of animal welfare. The moral explanation outlined above 
essentially suggests that we can satisfactorily explain the practical outcome of 
such regulation in terms of moral philosophy; utilitarianism, to be precise. 
Whatever the law happens to say in the abstract or prohibit or permit in practice 
may thus be assumed to result in an optimal distribution of pains and pleasures, 
or satisfied and frustrated interests, depending a bit on what school of 
utilitarianism one subscribes to. The weakness of this explanation, of course, is 
that much is indeed left to be assumed. Given the sheer amount of individuals 
(both humans and animals) involved, it’s extremely unlikely one could ever be 
                                                 
4  See ibid ix. 
5  Animal Welfare Council, ‘Welfare vs. Rights’ 
<https://www.animalwelfarecouncil.org/?page_id=16> accessed 30 September 2020. 
6  Robert Garner, ‘Animal Welfare: A Political Defense’ (2006) 1 Journal of Animal Law and 
Ethics 161, 163. 
7  ibid. 
8  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Blackwell 1999) 39. 
9  ibid. 
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able to accurately account for everyone’s—and I do mean everyone’s—pains, 
pleasures, or other relevant interests10. And so we assume, since that’s the best 
we can do, that the law both reflects and enforces utilitarian philosophy when it 
comes to the treatment of animals. 
On the other hand, we could also explain animal welfare in more, shall I say, 
economic terms. Gary Francione, for one, has argued that certain key terms of 
animal welfare theory, such as ‘unnecessary’ suffering and ‘humane’ treatment, 
are to be ‘interpreted in light of the legal status of animals as property, the 
importance of property in our culture, and’—and this is probably the most 
pertinent point—‘the general tendency of legal doctrine to protect and to 
maximize the value of property.’11 According to this view, animal welfare is 
essentially about wealth maximization, and the law consequently proscribes 
‘only those uses of animals that are not “efficient” or that decrease overall social 
wealth.’12 In other words, animal welfare legislation (allegedly, at any rate) 
reflects an ideology according to which society ought not intervene in the way 
property owners make use of their property unless said use is clearly wasteful.13 
The aforementioned points of view are not intended as an exhaustive list of 
reasons for the animal welfare position. Both the law as it is and the law as it 
perhaps ought to be may surely be explained and justified in numerous ways. 
The moral explanation is grounded in conceptions of right versus wrong, good 
versus bad, with animal welfare regulation, whether lata or ferenda, falling on 
the morally acceptable side of the boundary. The economic explanation, in turn, 
separates the efficient from the inefficient with similar results. I’ll have more to 
say about pursuing the same goal using different lines of argument later in 
section 4. For now, and as distasteful as the proverb might sound, it’s good to 
remember there’s always more than just one way to skin a cat. 
2.2 Animal Rights 
Against the animal welfare position, its moral explanation in particular, the 
animal rights view appears as a polar opposite of sorts. At stake is no longer how 
we use animals but the fact that we use them in the first place. And if animal 
welfare, according to Garner at least, meant ‘utilitarianism for animals, 
Kantianism for people’, it could well be argued that animal rights means 
Kantianism for both. 
Tom Regan, whose theory I take to be the most well known and exemplary 
one in the offering, once argued that all those who satisfy what he calls the 
‘subject-of-a-life criterion’—those who, among other things, ‘have beliefs and 
desires’, ‘perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own 
future’, ‘an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain’ and ‘an 
individual welfare in the sense that their experiental life fares well or ill for them, 
logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of 
                                                 
10  See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press 1983) 221–22. 
11  Gary L Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Temple University Press 2007) 4–5. 
12  ibid 5. 
13  See Darian M Ibrahim, ‘The Anticruelty Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare’ (2006) 1 
Journal of Animal Law and Ethics 175, 187, see also 182–83. 
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their being the object of anyone else’s interests’14—are valuable in and of 
themselves and are to be treated ‘in ways that respect their inherent value’15. 
Regan’s view is reminiscent of Kant, who believed that ‘the human being, and 
in general every rational being, exists as an end in itself’, that is, ‘something that 
may not be used merely as means’16. Their main difference? Kant saw animals 
as falling short of the requirement of rationality, from which it followed that 
humans had indirect duties at best with regard to them17. Conversely, for Regan, 
at least all ‘mentally normal mammals of a year or more’ make the cut18. So, to 
summarize, the animal rights position holds that at least some animals are 
valuable in a way that they may not be used as mere means or resources for the 
satisfaction of other people’s interests. 
Yet just like animal welfare theory could be explained in terms of moral 
philosophy and more economic considerations (and there may well be other 
explanations to be discovered still), so, too, can the concept of animal rights be 
understood in at least two different meanings. The first one, already outlined in 
the preceding paragraph, turns on what animals are owed as a matter of morality 
or justice. Understood in this way, animal rights is essentially about applying 
moral theory to the particular case of animals. What moral theory, you ask? The 
kind that says animals have inherent value and are to be treated in ways that 
recognize and respect that value. 
Should we adopt this view, and many do, we’d be right to deny the label 
‘animal rights’ from anything falling short of the aforementioned criteria. Most 
if not all contemporary legislation, for example, would not meet the requirements 
since the implication of such regulation seems to be that our needs, our interests 
come first. As such, the conclusion would be that there’s either very little animal 
rights legislation in the world today or perhaps none at all. 
On the other hand, it’s possible to understand animal rights in a more, shall 
we say, legal meaning. Visa Kurki, for instance, has convincingly argued that 
animals already hold legal rights, at least according to the so-called interest 
theory of rights19. This kind of an understanding of rights turns more on proper 
classification of protections as well as consistency in the way we use certain 
terms and concepts. What counts as a ‘right’ for humans should count as a right 
for animals, too. From this perspective, and in stark contrast to the other view 
entertained earlier, it would appear animals already enjoy plenty of rights under 
                                                 
14  Regan (n 10) 243. 
15  ibid 248 (emphasis omitted), see also 249, 264–65. 
16  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Allen W Wood ed and tr, Yale 
University Press 2002) 45–46 (emphasis omitted), see also 47. 
17  See Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Anthropology (Allen W Wood and Robert B Louden eds, 
Robert R Clewis and others trs, Cambridge University Press 2012) 17, 348. See also 
Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (Robert B Louden ed and tr, 
Cambridge University Press 2006) 15. 
18  Regan (n 10) 78. 
19  See Visa AJ Kurki, A Theory of Legal Personhood (Oxford University Press 2019) 61, 65–
66, 71, 201. See also Visa AJ Kurki, ‘Why Things Can Hold Rights: Reconceptualizing the 
Legal Person’ in Visa AJ Kurki and Tomasz Pietrzykowski (eds), Legal Personhood: 
Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn (Springer 2017) 71, 80–81. 
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extant law. Of course, their rights are often much more modest than the ones we 
humans have.20 
Just to make clear, from here on when I speak of animal rights in this paper, 
I’ll speak of animal rights understood according to the former of the two 
meanings described above. I’ll thus attach the label to any and all normative 
statements, whether already legally binding or not, that imply in one way or 
another that animals are valuable in and of themselves and must not be treated 
in ways that imply that they aren’t. 
3 The Logos of Animal Rights 
Bearing in mind what I just said about animal rights, the concept could probably 
be approached from an almost endless range of different perspectives, and I’ve 
no doubt most such perspectives would have something quite interesting to say 
about them. The vantage point from which I’ll be looking at animal rights in this 
paper, however, won’t be legal theory, moral philosophy, political theory, or any 
of the usual suspects. I’ll be looking at them through the lens of rhetoric. 
3.1 Rhetoric 
Much like the phrase ‘animal rights’, the word ‘rhetoric’ could be given a 
number of definitions none of which could necessarily claim to reach all the way 
into the very essence of the thing. In fact, it often appears that, as Richard 
Whately once wrote, people ‘seem not so much to have disagreed in their 
conceptions of the nature of the same thing, as to have had different things in 
view while they employed the same term.’21 It shouldn’t come as a huge surprise, 
then, that the concept of rhetoric has been subject to many an understanding and 
definition over the past couple of millennia. 
For starters, we could consider rhetoric an art or a skill, something to be used 
in a practical setting for the purpose of convincing an audience to think or act 
(or not to think or act) in some specific way. Indeed, ‘[r]hetoric’, writes Sam 
Leith, ‘is, as simply defined as possible, the art of persuasion: the attempt by one 
human being to influence another in words. It is no more complicated than 
that.’22 Though he subsequently entertains other meanings as well, he’s quick to 
remind the reader that this practically-oriented definition of the art should be 
considered the primary one23. Leith is in pretty good company in this regard, for 
something along these lines was also the first meaning of the art established by 
Plato’s character Socrates in the dialogue Gorgias: 
                                                 
20  See Visa Kurki, ’Eläinten oikeudet ja oikeussubjektius’ in Mai Kivelä, Veikka Lahtinen and 
Laura Uotila (eds), Uusi eläinlaki (Into 2017) 144–45. 
21  Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Southern Methodist Publishing House 1861) 15. 
22  Sam Leith, Words Like Loaded Pistols: Rhetoric from Aristotle to Obama (Basic Books 
2012) 1. 
23  ibid 2. 
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Socrates: Now I think you’ve come closest to making clear what craft you take 
oratory to be, Gorgias. If I follow you at all, you’re saying that oratory is a producer 
of persuasion. Its whole business comes to that, and that’s the long and short of it. 
Or can you mention anything else oratory can do besides instilling persuasion in the 
souls of an audience? 
Gorgias: None at all, Socrates. I think you’re defining it quite adequately. That is 
indeed the long and short of it.24 
But of course, there are other meanings as well. On the other hand, it’s 
possible to conceive of rhetoric as a ‘science’, if you will, a ‘faculty of observing 
in any given case the available means of persuasion.’25 So rather than themselves 
use whatever tools the art provides in an attempt to persuade, a practitioner of 
rhetoric may also use the art more as a theoretical framework for making sense 
of and evaluating instances of rhetoric as used by others. (Which, I might add, is 
more or less the way rhetorical theory is being used in this paper.) 
Finally, and I’ll be brief here, it must be admitted that the word ‘rhetoric’ has 
historically carried and continues to carry with it some rather unsavory 
connotations in the sense that people often not only use it to signify ‘flowery, 
ornamental speech laden with metaphors and other figures of speech’, but 
something far more sinister: ‘empty, bombastic language that has no substance’, 
‘spin’, even ‘deception of the kind we associate with the selling of used cars.’26 
So ‘[w]hen a politician calls for “action, not rhetoric,”’ write Jim Kuypers and 
Andrew King, ‘the meaning seems clear; rhetoric denotes hollow words and 
flashy language. It also connotes associations with deceit and tricks that mask 
truth and forthrightness.’27 
Whereas there certainly exist plenty of completely legitimate (not to mention 
morally impeccable) ways of making use of rhetoric in everyday life, the charge 
of flattery remains a staple criticism levelled against the art. This, then, is yet 
another meaning that has traditionally been associated with rhetoric. (Or perhaps 
this third meaning is more an offshoot of the first meaning described above than 
an independent one; all rhetoric3 is rhetoric1, but not all rhetoric1 is rhetoric3.) 
In light of the aforementioned definitions (or rather descriptions?) of rhetoric, 
I’d be willing to argue that animal rights can be meaningfully understood as a 
kind of rhetoric, primarily in the first meaning of the word discussed above. That 
is, animal rights discourse, to quote Leith out of context, represents an ‘attempt 
by one human being to influence another in words’, only this time it’s actually 
quite a large collective of people trying to influence another, even larger 
collective of people. I’ll have more to say about what kind of rhetoric animal 
rights discourse is in the next section. For now, I’ll satisfy myself with the view 
                                                 
24  Plato, ‘Gorgias’ in Plato, Complete Works (John M Cooper and DS Hutchinson eds, Donald 
J Zeyl tr, Hackett Publishing Company 1997) 452d–453a. Later in the dialogue, Socrates 
famously advances another, far less flattering account of what the art of persuasion is all 
about. 
25  Aristotle, Rhetoric (W Rhys Roberts tr, Dover Publications 2004) 1355b. 
26  Sonja K Foss, Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice (5th edn, Waveland Press 
2018) 3. 
27  Jim A Kuypers and Andrew King, ‘What is Rhetoric?’ in Jim A Kuypers (ed), Rhetorical 
Criticism: Perspectives in Action (Lexington Books 2009) 1. 
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that animal rights discourse is about persuading an audience to first think about 
animals in a very specific way—that they have inherent value and, consequently, 
rights—, then act on that belief. 
3.2 Pisteis 
So, if rhetoric is indeed the art or producer of persuasion, then how exactly is 
persuasion produced? What are the specific techniques of rhetoric that end up 
‘instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience’? 
Rhetorical theory has traditionally called such means of persuasion or proofs 
pisteis (singular pistis), and they come in two varieties: technical (pisteis 
entechnoi) and non-technical (pisteis atechnoi). ‘Of the modes of persuasion’, 
writes Aristotle, ‘some belong strictly to the art of rhetoric and some do not. By 
the latter’—the pisteis atechnoi or non-technical proofs—‘I mean such things as 
are not supplied by the speaker but are there at the outset—witnesses, evidence 
given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By the former’—the pisteis 
entechnoi or technical proofs—‘I mean such as we can ourselves construct by 
means of the principles of rhetoric. The one kind has merely to be used, the other 
has to be invented.’28 
Non-technical proofs, in other words, do not ‘come about through [the 
orator’s] agency’29—they’re already there, waiting on the shelf, as it were, the 
implication being that they essentially speak for themselves. Moreover, it may 
well be that their use is limited to the kind of judicial oratory that occurs in 
courtrooms30. ‘The technical pisteis, on the other hand,’ writes David Mirhady, 
‘had to be composed completely by the orator.’31 These are the kind of proofs 
that rhetoric is truly the art of, and what rhetoric itself is consequently really 
about. 
The pisteis entechnoi are further divided into three kinds often referred to as 
ethos, pathos and logos. ‘Persuasion’, writes Aristotle, ‘is achieved by the 
speaker’s personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think 
him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others’.32 
This is ethos, also known as the ethical appeal, that is, an appeal to the speaker’s 
character. ‘Secondly,’ he says, ‘persuasion may come through the hearers, when 
the speech stirs their emotions’, for ‘[o]ur judgements when we are pleased and 
friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile.’33 This is pathos, 
the appeal to the audience’s emotions. ‘Thirdly,’ and perhaps most importantly 
given our present purposes, ‘persuasion is effected through the speech itself 
when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive 
                                                 
28  Aristotle (n 25) 1355b. 
29  David Mirhady, ‘Non-Technical Pisteis in Aristotle and Anaximenes’ (1991) 112(1) The 
American Journal of Philology 5, 6. 
30  ibid. The concept of judicial (as well as other forms of) oratory will be discussed in section 
4. 
31  ibid. 
32  Aristotle (n 25) 1356a. 
33  ibid. 
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arguments suitable to the case in question.’34 This is logos, the appeal to the 
audience’s reason. ‘Logos, ethos, and pathos’, as summarized by Jay Heinrichs, 
‘appeal to the brain, gut, and heart of your audience. While our brain tries to sort 
the facts, our gut tells us whether we can trust the other person, and our heart 
makes us want to do something about it. They form the essence of effective 
persuasion.’35 
As far as I can see, animal rights discourse employs the third and final proof 
most of all. The animal rights advocate tries to persuade an audience primarily 
by appealing to their reason through logical arguments, not so much by 
emphasizing elements of their own character or by toying with their audience’s 
emotions. This should come as no surprise given the position’s roots in moral 
philosophy. Regan’s argument, for one, is logos through and through, and though 
him being an academic philosopher probably gives his words some added 
weight, and though the argument itself may find emotional resonance in at least 
some readers, it is reason, first and foremost, that forms the foundation of his 
case for animal rights36. 
Though logos often translates to the logical appeal37 and is generally about 
logic in every way imaginable, rhetoric doesn’t contain its own theory of logical 
argument. Rather, the art is parasitic on other fields of knowledge where rules 
concerning valid and sound arguments have been developed more fully38. And 
though the centerpiece of rhetorical logos is what Aristotle calls the 
enthymeme—‘a sort of syllogism’39, often (but not necessarily) in truncated 
form40—, at the end of the day, it’s propositional logic and syllogisms what logos 
is ultimately all about. 
The syllogism, write Robert and Susan Cockcroft, ‘first used by Aristotle and 
meaning “a putting together of two propositions”, denotes the deliberate, rule-
based and formalised employment of a deductive mode of argument.’41 The 
classical, categorical syllogism—which, as far as rhetoric goes, is the only 
syllogism the orator ought to worry about—is about linking together 
propositions about relationships that hold between different categories as a way 
of establishing new, previously unknown connections between said categories. 
The standard form contains three propositions mentioning a total of three so-
                                                 
34 ibid. 
35  Jay Heinrichs, Thank You for Arguing: What Cicero, Shakespeare and the Simpsons Can 
Teach Us About the Art of Persuasion (Penguin Books 2017) 40. 
36  See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (University of California Press 2004) xliii. 
37  See eg Edward PJ Corbett and Robert J Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student 
(Oxford University Press 1999). 
38  Aristotle himself considered rhetoric a ‘counterpart of Dialectic’. Aristotle (n 25) 1353b. 
39  ibid 1355a. 
40  See Christof Rapp, ‘Aristotle’s Rhetoric’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
edn, 2010) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/> accessed 
30 September 2020. 
41  Robert Cockcroft and Susan Cockcroft, Persuading People: An Introduction to Rhetoric (2nd 
edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 122. 
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All B are C. 
All A are B. 
∴ All A are C. 
 
Or, using more down-to-earth terms: 
 
All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. 
∴ Socrates is mortal. 
3.3 The Logos of Animal Rights 
But what would an argument for animal rights look like in similar form? The 
way I see it, animal rights discourse has always been about justifying the desired 
conclusion—rights for animals—not by reference to what would be appropriate 
or expedient for us human beings, but rather by reference to the animals 
themselves. More specifically, the justification for animal rights tends to turn on 
what kind of capabilities animals possess. We saw something like this already 
above with Regan, who required individuals to be what he termed ‘subjects-of-
a-life’ in order to have inherent value. In syllogistic form, the chain of thought 
would look something like this: 
 
All subjects-of-a-life have inherent value. 
Animals43 are subjects-of-a-life. 
∴ Animals have inherent value. 
 
However, Regan’s subject-of-a-life criterion, as we saw, is a rather 
complicated one. Far more commonly the bar is set at mere sentience, typically 
(though not exclusively) defined as ‘the capacity to suffer and/or experience 
enjoyment’44. Francione, for instance, has explicitly argued against the use of 
more demanding criteria, concluding that 
Whether nonhumans have minds that are similar or identical to ours may be 
interesting from a scientific perspective, but it is wholly irrelevant from a moral 
                                                 
42  See Terence Parsons, ‘The Traditional Square of Opposition’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer edn, 2017) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/square/> accessed 30 September 2020. 
43  Bear in mind Regan’s qualifications concerning the term—see n 18. 
44  Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (Avon Books 1975) 9. 
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perspective. If we take nonhuman interests seriously, we have no choice but to 
acknowledge that only sentience is relevant.45 
In a similar vein, Jeremy Bentham once famously wrote that ‘the question is 
not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?’46 Likewise, 
fellow utilitarian Peter Singer considered ‘the limit of sentience … the only 
defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others.’47 So, going by the 
seemingly more popular criterion of sentience, the argument for animal rights 
would take the following form: 
 
All sentient beings have rights. 
Animals are sentient beings. 
∴ Animals have rights. 
 
The style of argument outlined above seems intuitively appealing, and 
many—perhaps most—animal rights advocates still use it today. There’s but one 
problem with the argument: it doesn’t persuade. Well, it does persuade with 
regard to some animals, but not nearly as many as one would want to. 
Note that this is not a matter of validity. In that regard, the argument fares 
quite well. If—if—both premises actually hold water—sentient beings really do 
have rights, and animals really are sentient beings—, then arriving at the 
designated conclusion is not a matter of personal opinion but of logical necessity. 
The problem is not that the argument would be invalid. The problem is that it is 
unsound. 
On the one hand, some rather optimistic claims have been expressed in both 
literature and legislation concerning the distribution and prevalence of sentience 
in the animal kingdom. An oft-cited example would be article 13 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides that 
In formulating and implementing the Union's agriculture, fisheries, transport, 
internal market, research and technological development and space policies, the 
Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay full regard 
to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the legislative or 
administrative provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to 
religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage.48 
Likewise, biologist Marc Bekoff has argued in favor of a Universal 
Declaration on Animal Sentience. ‘We surely are not exceptional or alone in the 
arena of sentience’, he writes, and continues: 
There are sound biological reasons for recognizing animals as sentient beings. We 
need to abandon the anthropocentric view that only big-brained animals such as 
                                                 
45  Gary L Francione, ‘Taking Sentience Seriously’ (2006) 1 Journal of Animal Law and Ethics 
1, 17 (emphasis added). 
46  Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Clarendon 
Press 1907) 311. 
47  Singer (n 44) 8–9. 
48  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 
326 (emphasis added). 
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ourselves, nonhuman great apes, elephants, and cetaceans (dolphins and whales) 
have sufficient mental capacities for complex forms of sentience and 
consciousness.49 
However, while (or perhaps since) we may never be able to conclusively 
prove the sentience of each and every animal species, some advocates have 
resorted to the so-called precautionary principle in an attempt to reverse the 
burden of proof. The Finnish Animal Rights Law Society, for instance, is a group 
of lawyers who have drafted and proposed an amendment to the Finnish 
Constitution which, if enacted, would enshrine animal rights at the highest level 
of the Finnish legal system. Pursuant to section 1 of their proposal, ‘[s]entient 
animals are invidivuals [sic] whose fundamental rights and welfare requirements 
must be fully respected by humans. All animals shall be presumed to be sentient 
unless otherwise can be determined.’50 The latter sentence invokes the 
precautionary principle in all but name. An express mention of the principle can 
be found in the more detailed rationale attached to the section: 
Animal research has demonstrated that sentience is widespread among various 
animal species. However, given the current state of research, it is impossible to make 
a precise distinction between sentient and insentient species. There is some 
uncertainty especially in assessing the sentience of invertebrate species. The 
delimitation of sentient and insentient species is constantly changing and thus, when 
determining individual sentience in practice, the precautionary principle has to be 
applied for the benefit of the animal. According to the precautionary principle, all 
animals are considered to be sentient unless there is evidence to the contrary. Due to 
the scientific uncertainty, the provision assumes the sentience of animals.  Thus, lack 
of scientific certainty cannot be used as an excuse for neglecting animal rights 
provided by law.51 
On the other hand, and as suggested above, there is some uncertainty as to 
whether all animals are sentient after all. Whether fish, for example, can 
experience pain was questioned as recently as 2016. ‘What then do noxious 
stimuli feel like to a fish?’ asks Brian Key. ‘The evidence best supports the idea 
that they don’t feel like anything to a fish.’52 And whereas the 2012 Cambridge 
Declaration on Consciousness concluded that nonhuman animals, too, possess 
the kind of equipment required for generating consciousness, the taxa mentioned 
expressly—mammals, birds, octopuses—were all relatively uncontroversial if 
not well-established cases53. 
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In somewhat similar fashion, when the Scientific Panel on Animal Health and 
Welfare of the European Food Safety Authority was asked to ‘consider the 
scientific evidence for the sentience and capacity of all invertebrate species used 
for experimental purposes and of fetal and embryonic forms to “experience pain, 
suffering, distress or lasting harm”’54, the results were mixed. In its opinion, the 
panel established three categories in which studied taxa would then be placed 
depending on the quality of evidence of their sentience. For animals classified in 
Category 1, ‘[t]he scientific evidence clearly indicates that those groups of 
animals are able to experience pain and distress, or the evidence, either directly 
or by analogy with animals in the same taxonomic group(s), are able to 
experience pain and distress.’ In category 2, the case was the opposite: such 
animals were clearly not able to experience such negative sensations. Finally, 
Category 3 was to include such taxa where there was some evidence, but not 
enough to place them in either aforementioned category.55 
Some taxa were subsequently recommended for protection while others 
weren’t. Cyclostomes, all cephalopods, and all decapods were deemed to fall 
within Category 1 and thus deserve protection56. Tunicates, on the other hand, 
were placed in Category 3 and denied protection at present57 whereas the panel 
was of the opinion that for land gastropods such as snails and slugs, ‘[t]he case 
for a substantial degree of awareness would appear to be weak.’58 It followed 
that land gastropods were considered to belong in Category 259. As far as insects 
are concerned, it is noteworthy that social insects such as ants and bees were 
filed in Category 3 since ‘[t]hey might be aware to some extent but we have little 
evidence of a pain system.’60 All other insects were placed squarely in Category 
261. 
It would seem, then, that the jury is still out as to whether all members of the 
animal kingdom are sentient even if many of them certainly or at least most 
likely are. Yet even if such uncertainties could be decided in the animals’ favor 
by application of the precautionary principle, supporters of the principle have 
themselves warned against practical issues should the principle be invoked too 
lightly. Jonathan Birch calls it an ‘extreme proposal’ to ‘assume an animal is 
sentient unless there is conclusive evidence to the contrary’ since such a position 
could be considered unscientific, perhaps even anti-scientific. ‘[T]he science of 
animal sentience’, he writes, ‘would become more or less irrelevant to the scope 
of animal protection law’, for ‘it is hard to see how research could “prove 
otherwise” in any interesting case.’ For him, ‘it seems reasonable that some 
                                                 
54  ‘Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Animal Health and Welfare on a request from the 
Commission related to “Aspects of the biology and welfare of animals used for experimental 
and other scientific purposes”’ (2005) 3(12) EFSA Journal 1, 2. 
55  ibid 20. 
56  ibid 14–17. 
57  ibid 14–15. 
58  ibid 15. 
59  ibid 16. 
60  ibid. 
61  ibid. 
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evidential bar for sentience should have to be cleared’ and, consequently, ‘[t]here 
cannot be a default presumption of sentience in all cases.’62 
Arthur Reber, on the other hand, underlines the relevance of ‘pragmatic cost-
benefit analyses’ should ‘all species come under the umbrella of the legislative 
reach of animal rights laws.’ ‘If there is no demonstrable threshold for invoking 
the [Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle]’, he writes, ‘then the 
determinations must be carried out using a different framework, one more 
focused on pragmatic and practical considerations.’63 Put differently, it’s 
difficult to protect everything with equal force, and such a problem would be 
further compounded by the inclusion of taxa that are potentially dangerous or 
otherwise harmful to humans, other animals, or the environment64. 
A related concern has to do with the distribution of sentience (or any other 
capability, for that matter) within taxa. The views expressed above, both those 
in favor of animal sentience and those against it, have examined the question at 
the level of species or some other, higher taxa. Yet it is also possible to adopt a 
more micro-level perspective and ask whether all members of a taxon must 
necessarily conform to the paradigm. 
This is precisely what the so-called ‘argument from marginal cases’ seeks to 
do with respect to human beings. The argument reminds us that whatever criteria 
we set for moral considerability or perhaps even significance, there are some 
human individuals, those ‘marginal cases’, that don’t make the cut. And since 
we choose not to enforce the criteria when it comes to our dealings with such 
people, consistency demands we grant the same privileges to at least some 
animals as well.65 
In other words, and according to Oscar Horta, ‘[t]he argument points out that 
there are individuals of a certain species who do not satisfy some criteria that 
members of this species are commonly assumed to satisfy’—such as all humans 
at certain phases of their lives66. It should be noted that this is in perfect 
conformity with what evolutionary theory predicts. Evolution rules out the 
possibility of timeless, immutable ‘essences’ at the core of species identity, ‘for 
seldom’, writes David Hull, ‘is a property of any taxonomic value distributed 
both universally and exclusively among the members of a taxon. The properties 
of which are used to define the names of taxa do not respect taxonomic 
boundaries.’67 No wonder biologists cannot even agree on the definition of 
species. 
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The rhetorical case for animal rights, then, seems to be founded on shaky 
ground. At the end of the day, a logical argument will only be as compelling as 
its weakest link. The logos of animal rights, as described above, requires both 
premises to be true for the argument to succeed. The first, major premise (eg ‘all 
sentient beings have rights’) turns on values instead of empirically discoverable 
facts, and whether or not such a premise is accepted will depend largely on the 
convictions of the rhetor’s audience. 
Even assuming the acceptance of the major premise, it would appear that the 
second, minor premise will be true only with regard to some parts of the animal 
kingdom. Some species are sentient, some probably aren’t. And even when it 
comes to the former kinds of species, it remains an open question whether all 
such individuals ultimately are. 
4 Animal Rights and Rhetorical Topoi 
Whereas most human uses of animals tend to target species that probably have 
rights according to the animal rights view, I don’t see why one couldn’t (and 
perhaps shouldn’t, either) pursue the same end results using different kinds of 
tools. And so, I propose the effectiveness of animal rights discourse could be 
further improved by a richer understanding of what are called ‘topics’ in 
rhetorical theory. Such topics would not only strengthen the case for protecting 
sentient animals, they would also largely circumvent the kind of problems 
associated with coverage as described in the previous section. Before I discuss 
these so-called topics in greater detail, however, I must first say a couple of 
words about what different kinds of rhetoric there are. 
4.1 Branches of Oratory 
Another important grouping of threes in rhetorical theory has to do with how 
instances of rhetoric can be divided into different categories depending on the 
context in which they occur as well as their purpose. Thus, we recognize three 
distinct genres of oratory: political (also known as deliberative), forensic (also 
known as judicial), and ceremonial (also known as epideictic). 
‘Political speaking’, writes Aristotle, ‘urges us to either do or not to do 
something’. ‘Forensic speaking either attacks or defends somebody’, and ‘[t]he 
ceremonial oratory of display either praises or censures somebody.’68 Beyond 
this, the three genres also operate in different time. Political rhetoric always 
targets the future—‘it is about things to be done hereafter that [the political 
orator] advises, for or against.’ Judicial oratory (that is, courtroom rhetoric) 
concerns things that have already happened, and ceremonial oratory refers to 
virtue and vice in the present.69  
Let’s imagine for a moment that you’re a writer or a speaker who has been 
handed a subject to write or talk about, but have not yet decided what exactly to 
say about it. Ancient rhetors were kind enough to bequeath to us a list of so-
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called ‘topics’, ‘an ancient set of pedagogical resources designed to help 
speakers and writers invent arguments for public debate.’70 Topos (plural topoi) 
in Greek and locus (plural loci) in Latin, a topic is quite literally a ‘place’ where 
standard arguments could be found for just about any subject imaginable71. 
‘Thus’, write Cockcroft and Cockcroft, ‘a persuader might glance through the 
topoi for possible arguments, just as someone might run through a mental 
checklist when preparing for some activity or event.’72 
Topics are further divided into the common and the special. Much like the 
name suggests, the common topics could be employed in most if not all 
situations due to their general nature.  For present purposes, however, we’re 
interested in just the special topics. By now, the reason for bringing up the 
tripartite division into political, forensic, and ceremonial rhetoric will become 
plain. The special topics are so called because they are specific to each branch 
of oratory. According to Aristotle, 
Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three kinds. The political 
orator aims at establishing the expediency or the harmfulness of a proposed course 
of action; if he urges its acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if 
he urges its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all other 
points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, 
he brings in as subsidiary and relative to this main consideration. Parties in a law-
case aim at establishing the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in 
all other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise or attack a 
man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse, and they too treat all other 
considerations with reference to this one.73 
4.2 The Advantageous 
Earlier in this paper, I argued that animal rights discourse can be understood as 
a kind of rhetoric that seeks to persuade an audience. And of what? To do or not 
to do something with regard to the future. The rhetoric of animal rights, then, 
falls primarily within the branch of political or deliberative oratory, and it is 
according to such standards that it ought to be evaluated.  
Against this backdrop, the logos of animal rights discussed in section 3 
appears even more out of place. That logos, it will be recalled, was primarily74 
about what animals are owed as a matter of morality or justice. Justice demands 
this, therefore we should do that. But morality and justice are hardly leading 
topics for the future-oriented business of political rhetoric. Matters of justice, 
right, and wrong belong more properly to the judicial oratory of the past. None 
of this is to suggest one shouldn’t be allowed to appeal to such considerations at 
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all, of course; it’s merely to suggest such considerations ought to be secondary 
to the more primary argument from expedience.  
Likewise, considerations of morality, values, virtue, and vice are the bread 
and butter of epideictic rhetoric. ‘The rhetoric of the present’, writes Heinrichs, 
‘handles praise and condemnation, separating the good from the bad, 
distinguishing groups from other groups and individuals from each other. … It 
celebrates heroes or condemns a common enemy. It gives people a sort of tribal 
identity.’75 But as satisfying as it might be to separate the virtuous from the 
vicious, chances are both will simply dig deeper into their respective trenches. 
For meaningful change, something other than tribalism is required. 
It is my argument that animal rights discourse should become more heavily 
invested in the special topic of the advantageous and explore the possibility of 
furthering the interests of animals by reference to the corresponding interests of 
human beings. Garner once remarked how, ‘[a]long with the deep ecology 
movement, animal rights is the only cause that seeks to advance the interests of 
non-human species, even when these interests are in conflict with the significant 
interests of humans.’76 This may not necessarily have to be so. ‘It is a truism’, 
he wrote, ‘that improvements in animal well being are more likely to come about 
when human and animal interests are not in conflict.’77 ‘Even more likely to 
succeed’, he continued, 
are those reforms improving the well being of animals we can identify which are 
beneficial to humans as a by-product. For example, focusing on the health and 
environmental consequences of factory farming would seem to be an astute tactical 
ploy.78 
At a glance, human and animal interests may overlap at least in the context of 
human health, the environment, and what I’ll call human rights for the time 
being. I’ll now briefly sketch how each of these lines of argument might look 
like. 
4.2.1 Human Health 
Firstly, issues having to do with human health provide several opportunities for 
improving the societal status of animals. For example, in 2015, the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer evaluated the carcinogenity of meat 
consumption and concluded that red meat is ‘probably carcinogenic to humans 
… based on limited evidence that the consumption of red meat causes cancer in 
humans and strong mechanistic evidence supporting a carcinogenic effect.’79 
The finding concerned mostly colorectal cancer, but also pancreatic cancer and 
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prostate cancer80. Processed meat fared even worse and was deemed 
carcinogenic ‘based on sufficient evidence’ of causing colorectal cancer, the risk 
increasing by 18% for each 50 grams consumed a day81. Though the nutritional 
value of red meat was duly noted, the director of the Agency was quoted as 
stating that ‘[t]hese findings further support current public health 
recommendations to limit intake of meat’82. 
According to another study published in 2015, ‘recent evidence from the 
epidemiologic literature suggests that the increasing consumption of red meat, 
especially in its processed forms, may have adverse health effects’.83 Whereas 
complete abstinence from meat was again noted to carry with it certain risks, 
especially ‘if no animal-based foods at all are consumed’84, increased intake of 
red and processed meat over long periods of time was linked with far more 
serious conditions: a potential ‘increase in the risk of mortality, cardiovascular 
disease, certain forms of cancer such as colon cancer and type 2 diabetes.’85 The 
study recommended more restrictive recommendations for consumption of red 
meat and even more so when it came to processed meat, insinuating the latter 
might be best to be avoided altogether86. 
A further study published in 2016 similarly underlined the potential link 
between meat consumption and an increased risk of death and of developing 
chronic illnesses87. ‘Overall,’ the author wrote, ‘it is plausible to conclude, 
taking into account the available scientific evidence, that high consumption of 
red meat, and especially processed meat, is associated with the increased risk of 
several major chronic diseases and preterm mortality.’88 Of some interest is the 
fact that the study also mentioned expressly the environmental burden associated 
with the meat industry89. 
Last but certainly not least, it would seem almost irresponsible to write about 
how our treatment of animals may have adverse effects on our on health in 2020 
and not mention the COVID-19 pandemic. By now, it seems probable that the 
virus causing the disease originated in bats90. Though certainly not part of the 
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diet of your average westerner, many authors have leapt at the opportunity of 
being able to generalize the origin story of COVID-19 to apply to western 
intensive animal agriculture as well91. A bit of a stretch, perhaps, but a recent 
report does add some credence to the analogy. ‘Diseases are emerging more 
frequently from animals’, reads one of the report’s key messages92. According 
to another key message, more than half of all human infections are estimated to 
have originated in animals whereas about three fourths of all new and emerging 
diseases ‘jump’ to humans from other animal species93. Ranking first among 
seven factors cited as ‘most likely driving the emergence of zoonotic diseases’? 
‘[I]ncreasing human demand for animal protein’.94 
It should be noted that bats are mammals and therefore fall quite neatly within 
the scope of the classical moral argument for animal rights as described earlier 
in this paper. Still, the human health argument provides an additional, more 
anthropocentric reason for arriving at a somewhat similar conclusion. Besides, 
it’s not as if the moral argument alone has managed to end most prominent forms 
of animal exploitation since being popularized almost 50 years ago. Beyond 
mammals and other easy cases, of course, the moral argument becomes relatively 
weaker while the human health argument becomes relatively stronger. 
4.2.2 The Environment 
Secondly, results roughly in line with the animal rights view could potentially 
be pursued on grounds of protecting the environment. The main culprit here, as 
with the human health approach, is the animal food industry. According to a 
2014 study, the diet of a meat-eater is responsible for as much as 2.5 times the 
greenhouse gas emissions of that of a vegan95. Reductions in the consumption 
of meat were consequently deemed likely to reduce dietary greenhouse gas 
emissions as well96, marking also ‘a valuable contribution to climate change 
mitigation’97. The authors’ conclusion was that dietary recommendations 
                                                 
91  See eg Laura Spinney, ‘It takes a whole world to create a new virus, not just China’ (The 
Guardian, 25 March 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/new-virus-china-covid-19-
food-markets> accessed 30 September 2020; Sigal Samuel, ‘The meat we eat is a pandemic 
risk, too’ (Vox, 20 August 2020) <https://www.vox.com/future-
perfect/2020/4/22/21228158/coronavirus-pandemic-risk-factory-farming-meat> accessed 30 
September 2020. 
92  United Nations Environment Programme and International Livestock Research Institute, 
‘Preventing the Next Pandemic: Zoonotic diseases and how to break the chain of 
transmission’ (United Nations Environment Programme 2020) 7. 
93  ibid. 
94  ibid. 
95  Peter Scarborough and others, ‘Dietary greenhouse gas emissions of meat-eaters, fish-eaters, 
vegetarians and vegans in the UK’ (2014) 125 Climatic Change 179, see also 186. 
96  ibid 179. 
97  ibid 188.  
20 Tero Kivinen: Animal Rights and Rhetorical Topoi 
premised on health and sustainability must also ‘incorporate the 
recommendation to lower the consumption of animal-based products.’98 
Another study published in 2014 warned that by 2050, certain global dietary 
trends, ‘if unchecked, would be a major contributor to an estimated 80 per cent 
increase in global agricultural greenhouse gas emissions from food production 
and to global land clearing.’99 Reference was also made to many chronic 
illnesses discussed in the previous section. According to the authors, alternative 
diets, ‘if widely adopted’, could not only prevent such chronic diseases but also 
reduce emissions, land clearing, and extinction of species.100 ‘The 
implementation’, the study concluded, ‘of dietary solutions to the tightly linked 
diet-environment-health trilemma is a global challenge, and opportunity, of great 
environmental and public health importance.’101 
Beyond greenhouse gas emissions, the livestock sector’s impact on the 
quality of air, water and soil in general has also garnered some attention. ‘Meat’, 
said one paper published in 2015, ‘is one of the food products with the greatest 
environmental impact due to the inefficiency of animals in converting feed to 
meat’102, the associated sector being ‘one of the leading polluters in the food 
industry.’103 On a related note, the animal food industry has been accused of 
being just that—inefficient. Critics have called concentrated animal feeding 
operations ‘factories in reverse’, emphasizing the abysmal ratio at which animal 
feed is converted to the final product104. Perhaps it is even possible that economic 
efficiency could be considered an independent line of argument utilizing the 
special topic of the advantageous. The argument, in essence, would be that it is 
expedient to utilize finite resources in an economically efficient manner whereas 
it is harmful to do the opposite. 
4.2.3 Human Rights 
Thirdly, and finally, human and animal interests might also coincide in terms of 
human rights, or perhaps global justice might sometimes be a more suitable term. 
That is, whatever risks, costs and other adverse effects are associated with animal 
exploitation, such risks, costs and effects tend to be distributed among human 
populations in ways that might, at worst, arguably constitute human rights 
violations. Melanie Joy, for one, dedicated an entire chapter of her 2010 book to 
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such ‘collateral damage’, stressing the interconnectedness of human and animal 
suffering: 
These other casualties of carnism are rarely the focus of attention when discussing 
meat production. They, too, are invisible victims—not because they are not seen, but 
because they are not recognized. They are the human animals. They are the factory 
workers, the residents who live near polluting [concentrated animal feeding 
operations], the meat consumers, the taxpayers. They are you and I. We are the 
collateral damage of carnism; we pay for it with our health, our environment, and 
our taxes…105 
According to one report cited above, for example, ‘The greatest burden of 
zoonotic disease is borne by poor people’106, underlining the fact that such issues 
are not only matters of public health but also matters of equality—at the end of 
the day, ‘it is the poorest and the most vulnerable’, writes UN Environment 
Programme Executive Director Inger Andersen, ‘who suffer the most’107. In this 
regard, it was interesting to note how the 2018 edition of the Animal Law 
Conference, organized jointly by Lewis & Clark Law School and the Animal 
Legal Defense Fund, and themed Law and the Farmed Animal: Policy, 
Advocacy, and Culture, included also one panel specializing in the human 
victims of intensive animal farming. Speaking under the heading of Collateral 
Damage: Factory Farming Impacts Beyond the Animals, the panelists discussed 
not only the environmental impact of CAFOs but also the harm they cause to 
farmworkers and nearby residents.108 
Considerations of human rights, equality, and global justice, then, could 
provide one further avenue for pursuing similar conclusions as the animal rights 
view.  
5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper began by showing how the rhetoric of animal rights (as defined in 
section 2) operates on premises that risk significantly narrowing that rhetoric’s 
range of application. The traditional and still popular way of justifying the 
desired conclusion by reference to animal sentience or some other capabilities 
deemed morally relevant probably has the effect of excluding most animals (that 
is, members of the kingdom Animalia) from that coveted category of rights-
holders. Moreover, it’s not altogether clear whether, according to the logic of the 
enterprise, possessing rights ought to be a binary affair at the taxa level. Recall 
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Hull from above: ‘seldom is a property of any taxonomic value distributed both 
universally and exclusively among the members of a taxon. The properties of 
which are used to define the names of taxa do not respect taxonomic 
boundaries.’109 For all we know, there are marginal animals just as there are 
marginal cases of humanity. 
However, when it comes to the persuasiveness of the rhetoric of animal rights, 
it is striking how discourse focused on future choices should rely so heavily on 
arguments grounded in considerations of what is moral or just. In some ways, 
the inefficiency of this reliance on moral appeals speaks for itself. Soon enough, 
50 years will have passed since the publication of Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation, and 40 since the publication of Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal 
Rights, yet most humans continue to lead unjust, immoral lives. Could it be that 
the moral argument just isn’t enough on its own? Is something more required in 
addition to it—or perhaps in its stead? 
As a remedy to this arguable lack of social impact, I proposed the special 
topic of the advantageous and sketched briefly three potential applications 
thereof: human health, the environment, and what for the most part I termed 
human rights. It is not my intention to claim that these lines of argument would 
themselves be somehow novel. Singer himself, for instance, may have given 
animal interests a place of pride in his argument, but even he was quick to appeal 
to world hunger as well as the fishing industry being ‘one more form of 
redistribution from the poor to the rich’ once the opportunity presented itself110. 
Likewise, in a 2010 article, Megan Senatori and Pamela Frasch argue that animal 
law attorneys should make more frequent use of human-interest arguments. 
‘Doing so’, they write, ‘does not undermine animal protection arguments, it 
enhances them, by recognizing that humans and animals often share interests 
that are more aligned than many people initially realize.’111 If anything, I hope 
to have organized such lines of argument under a new framework, one that hasn’t 
received as much attention in animal rights circles as it perhaps should’ve. 
Nor am I claiming that appeals to more anthropocentric considerations would 
necessarily lead to a full realization of animal rights theory as envisioned by 
Regan, for example. Appeals to morality are likely to reach further and prohibit 
more than appeals to mere expediency. Maxim Fetissenko summarizes the 
dangers aptly: 
There is also some fear that human health and environmental arguments take away 
from the importance of the movement’s core claim: animals are sentient beings and 
are not ours to use as we please, just as black people were not created to be used as 
slaves by white people and women were not created to serve men. And what if some 
new advance in medicine made it possible to reconcile consumption of animal 
products with good human health, or if scientists found a way to lessen the impact 
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of animal farming on the environment? From this perspective, the moral argument 
is not only the strongest: It is the only one that animal rights advocates should use.112 
An unfortunate, unintended consequence of ‘animal rights without animal 
rights’ might indeed be that improved, more efficient and convenient forms of 
mass-scale exploitation of animals would be allowed to continue in perpetuity. 
After all, if animals don’t get the benefit of at least some watered-down version 
of Kantianism, there’s nothing, in principle, that we couldn’t do to them as long 
as the consequences play out favorably. It’s entirely possible, of course, that 
more advantageous forms of animal exploitation would, for example, result in 
less animals being bred and killed for food, somewhat reminiscent of the second 
of the Three Rs. On the other hand, those selected for extermination would still 
lose everything. So much for respecting that inherent value. 
‘Animal rights without animal rights’ might well turn out to be an 
impossibility, at least according to some understandings of what rights mean and 
entail. But that shouldn’t necessarily mean that the idea of pursuing similar goals 
through different means ought to be jettisoned completely. ‘Don’t let the perfect 
be the enemy of the good’, or so the saying goes. If anything, I hope to have 
shown that rhetorical theory in general and the topics in particular might have 
something of value to offer for animal rights advocates and be worthy of more 
serious, systematic inquiry than has been the case thus far. It is my belief that 
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